The Fifth District Appellate Court affirmed St. Clair County Circuit Judge Zina Cruse’s order denying a convicted murder’s request for a new trial.
Justice Barry Vaughan delivered the opinion on Nov. 15 with Justices Thomas Welch and John Barberis concurring.
Defendant Antrell Teen, who was convicted of murder and aggravated battery, sought appellate review. He argued that his speedy trial rights were violated, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue his speedy trial rights, and the court committed reversible error when it barred him from presenting additional claims and evidence at a hearing.
The appellate court disagreed.
According to the appellate court opinion, Teen was charged on June 29, 2014, with one count of first degree murder of Cassandra Holman and one count of aggravated battery for knowingly discharging a firearm and injuring Shanter Bonner. He was indicted on Sept. 5, 2014. Teen was apprehended in Missouri on Dec. 11, 2015, and was processed into the St. Clair County jail on Dec. 15, 2015.
Gregory Nester from the public defender’s office was originally appointed as counsel. Then on Dec. 28, 2015, Mark Peebles from the public defender's office was assigned to Teen’s case.
The circuit court granted continuances “by agreement/without objection” at hearings held in February and March 2016. Defense counsel appeared at those hearings, but Teen did not attend any of the hearings. Then on April 20, 2016, Teen filed correspondence stating he “originally asked to exercise [his] right to a speedy trial December 16, 2015.”
Teen claimed he hadn’t heard from his attorney and did not agree to a delay of his case. He filed a pro se motion to dismiss due to an alleged noncompliance with his speedy trial request.
During a status conference on April 28, 2016, Teen was made aware of the speedy trial period and how the “60 days” are tolled. A trial date was set for May 23, 2016. Defense counsel mentioned that he did not believe he would be ready.
“You have no choice,” Cruse responded. “This is his demand. He has that right. You’re going to have to get ready.”
The state then requested a continuance due to witness availability, and the parties agreed to June 20, 2016. After the four-day trial, Teen was found guilty of both aggravated battery and first degree murder.
Teen moved for a new trial, claiming he was deprived of a fair trial by an impartial jury and ineffective assistance of counsel.
His motion was later denied on May 22, 2018. Cruse concluded that Teen could not show prejudice.
“The parties proceeded to sentencing, where the court sentenced defendant to 6 years’ incarceration on the aggravated battery count to run consecutively to a 50-year term of incarceration on the first degree murder count. After the court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider the sentence, defendant timely appealed,” the opinion states.
The appellate court disagreed with Teen’s arguments, finding his contentions are not supported by the record.
“While defendant contends he asserted his speedy trial right at his first appearance prior to the arraignment, there is no report of proceedings for this appearance. It was defendant’s duty, as the appellant, to present a complete record on appeal. In the absence thereof, any doubts will be resolved against him,” Vaughan wrote.
He adds that there is no indication in the record that Teen filed a letter in March 2016 indicating his desire for a speedy trial and counsel’s alleged poor communication.
Further, the appellate court concluded that Teen’s trial was still held in the allotted time frame.
“Even assuming all continuances after April 28, 2016, could not be attributed to defendant, he was still tried within the statutory speedy trial period. His argument in this respect therefore fails,” Vaughan wrote.
As for the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the appellate court concluded that Cruse’s findings that Teen’s claim lacked merit “was not manifestly erroneous.”
“Defendant in no way claimed, and the facts do not support, that a reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceedings would have been different had counsel informed defendant that he intended to continue the case,” Vaughan wrote. “There is not indication that the delay somehow negatively affected the ability to present his defense or provided some benefit to the state’s prosecution. Further, defendant fails to argue, or explain, how the state would have failed to bring defendant to trial within the statutory period had defendant been able to object to the continuances.”
However, the appellate court noted that Teen may still bring ineffectiveness claims not previously presented at his hearing. He may assert those additional claims on direct appeal or through the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.