EAST ST. LOUIS – U.S. District Judge Nancy Rosenstengel should ignore an affidavit of St. Clair County Circuit Clerk Kahalah Clay in a dispute over a date on a document, according to defendants in a civil suit involving a paintless dent removal company.
Shaun Broeker, on behalf of three body shop owners defending a suit of former partner Wesley Huff of Collinsville, challenged the affidavit on Sept. 16.
The affidavit states that an electronic filing error made it necessary for St. Clair County Chief Judge Andrew Gleeson to change a date on a complaint.
Gleeson’s action kept the complaint within a statute of limitations for Huff and his Mirror Image body shop.
“Why did plaintiffs wait four months after defendants first made the statute of limitations argument to gather this evidence?” Broeker’s brief asks.
Broeker repeated a previous request to declare Gleeson’s order void.
He disputed a statement by Huff’s lawyer Sean Cronin that a call to Clay’s office would have educated him about his "conspiracy theory."
“It’s not a conspiracy theory,” he wrote. “In fact, it’s admitted at this point.”
Huff sued former partners Charles Binkley, Eric Stokes, and Andy Clawson in St. Clair County Circuit Court this spring.
Binkley, Stokes, and Clawson had won a court order against Huff in St. Louis County Circuit Court in December, and they awaited an award of damages.
Huff’s St. Clair County complaint alleged unjust enrichment, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, fraudulent inducement, and conspiracy, all under state law.
He also claimed violation of federal racketeering law.
In his complaint, he alleged that a "frivolous" RICO suit was filed in retaliation to a non-compete lawsuit in which the competitor was sanctioned twice.
Clay’s office stamped the complaint April 7.
On April 10, St. Louis County Circuit Judge Ellen Ribaudo ordered Huff to pay Binkley, Stokes, and Clawson about $700,000.
On May 12, Broeker removed the St. Clair County suit to district court.
He argued that the racketeering claim required federal jurisdiction. He also moved to dismiss the complaint, pleading that the statute of limitations ran out on March 31, five years after Huff resigned from the partnership.
On June 1, Cronin amended the complaint to delete the racketeering claim.
On June 4, Gleeson entered an order deeming the complaint filed on March 30.
“The circuit clerk’s office wrongly rejected this case originally sent through the Odyssey efile system,” Gleeson wrote.
He found it should have been stamped with the original date.
Cronin moved to remand the suit to St. Clair County on June 9, claiming federal jurisdiction ended when the racketeering claim ended.
Cronin wrote that the filing date was incorrectly and inadvertently stamped April 7, and was subsequently corrected by the circuit clerk.
Rosenstengel denied remand on Aug. 7, stating she noted the conduct of the parties and the pending claims.
She found the Seventh Circuit Appellate Court gave her wide latitude to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims when the plaintiff showed signs of playing games.
Cronin opposed the motion to dismiss on Aug. 21, stating Huff indisputably filed the suit within five years of Huff’s resignation.
On Aug. 27, Broeker replied that the stamp proved the suit was filed April 7.
Cronin moved to strike the reply on Sept. 4, calling it redundant, immaterial, impertinent, scandalous and false.
He claimed it alleged misconduct against him and implicitly alleged misconduct against the chief judge and the circuit clerk’s office.
“There was nothing improper done by anyone with regard to the administrative action of correcting an incorrect file stamp date on a pleading,” Cronin wrote.
Broeker opposed the motion to strike his reply 12 days later, asking Rosenstengel to view it “in the same vein as this entire lawsuit, a meritless filing.”
“These are the same tactics that led plaintiff Huff to be sanctioned twice by the Honorable Ellen Ribaudo in the circuit court of St. Louis County, Missouri,” Broeker wrote.
“The court should not allow plaintiffs to introduce new evidence supporting their argument against dismissal in a motion to strike.”
Broeker claims Binkley, Stokes, and Clawson would suffer prejudice if Rosenstengel considered Clay’s affidavit and another from Cronin’s firm, Donovan Rose Nester.
He argues that Huff didn’t submit them in opposition to the motion to dismiss.
He also argues that the court should only consider pleadings, documents referenced in the complaint, and certain documents by judicial notice.
“The two affidavits submitted by plaintiffs do not fall into any of these categories so the court should ignore them,” Broeker wrote.
He wrote that even if Gleeson’s order wasn’t void, it wouldn’t save Huff’s claims as defendants provided multiple additional grounds for dismissal.